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HEALTH MATRIX
A COMPLEX HEALTH CARE information infrastructure is
emerging in the American health care system. The success
of the system will depend, in part, on the accuracy, correctness,
and trustworthiness of the information and the privacy rights of
individuals to control the disclosure of personal information.
All participants in the new system (consumers and patients,
health plans, and federal and state regulatory authorities) will
need access to high quality information for informed decision
making. At the same time, everyone must have confidence that
information of a private nature is adequately protected.
American society places a high value on individual rights,
autonomous decision making, and the protection of the private
sphere from governmental or other intrusion. Concerns about
privacy transcend the health care setting. Americans believe
that their privacy rights as consumers are not adequately pro-
tected. In a 1993 Harris poll on consumer privacy conducted
for Equifax, Inc., 78 % of the respondents indicated their con-
cern about threats to privacy. Eight out of ten respondents be-
lieved that consumers have lost all control over how personal
information about them is circulated and used.' Public fear and
distrust of both technology and bureaucracy is likely to in-
crease as collection, storage, and dissemination of information
becomes automated.
Health care information is perhaps the most intimate, per-
sonal, and sensitive of any information maintained about an in-
dividual. As the U.S. health care system grows in size, scope,
and integration, the vulnerability of that information also will
increase unless protective measures are instituted.
This Article explains the objectives for the collection, stor-
age, and use of information in the health care system and the
means to attain those objectives.2 The goals are to ensure (1)
the integrity of health data so information is accurate, correct,
and trustworthy - the integrity of information is critical to
1. Louis HARRIS AND Assocs.. HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY SURVEY 22 (1993).
See also Louis HARRIS AND Assocs.. HARRIS-EQUIFAx CONSUMER PRIVACY SURVEY 1992,
at 52 (1992).
2. See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L
REV. (forthcoming 1995).
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quality patient care, assessment of services, research, and pub-
lic health; (2) the availability of health data so authorized per-
sons who need the information for legitimate health purposes
have ready access to the data - if clinical information is not
readily available to health care providers, the best interests of
patients may be significantly compromised; and (3) the confi-
dentiality of health data so patients and consumers can be as-
sured that personal information is only disclosed to authorized
persons for authorized purposes at authorized times - identifi-
able data can be released only with the informed consent of the
patient or consumer.
The goals of integrity, availability, and confidentiality of
health care data can only be achieved by establishing an appro-
priate privacy and security framework. Although the definition
of privacy and the nature of privacy rights are matters of philo-
sophical controversy, privacy rights are understood as the right
of an individual to limit access by others to some aspect of the
person. This Article focuses on informational privacy so that
information about a person is beyond the range of others with-
out specific authorization.
Confidentiality is a form of informational privacy charac-
terized by a special relationship, such as the physician-patient
relationship. Personal information obtained in the course of
that relationship should not be revealed to others unless the pa-
tient is first made aware and consents to its disclosure.- Secur-
ity encompasses a set of technical and administrative proce-
dures designed to protect data systems against unwarranted
disclosure, modification, or destruction and to safeguard the
system itself.4
This Article first examines the needs for information in a
modern health care system, including automated information.
Second, a brief contemporary history of privacy law and policy
is presented to show that the ideas are not new, but have been
thoughtfully developed over time. Third, the ethical founda-
tions for safeguarding privacy are explored so that changes in
law and policy are consistent with sound ethical values. Fourth,
a comprehensive set of fair information practices are presented
3. The terms privacy and confidentiality are discussed further at notes 64-71 infra
and accompanying text.
4. The term security is discussed further at notes 80-85 infra and accompanying text.
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that will guide all participants in the new system in the collec-
tion and use of confidential information. Fifth, the security of
health information systems, particularly automated systems, is
examined. Finally, the Article sets out a series of actions neces-
sary for ensuring the integrity, availability, and confidentiality
of health records.
I. HEALTH INFORMATION IN A MODERN
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
The collection and transmission of vast amounts of health
information in automated form will occur with or without re-
form of the health care system. While comprehensive reform at
the national level is unlikely for the immediate future, reform
is taking place at the state level and within the private sector.
A health care system in transition will create a need for addi-
tional information for monitoring patient care and assessing
system performance. A modern health care system requires the
sharing of a large volume of detailed health information among
system players. The health information infrastructure that is
being developed will have the following features that are criti-
cally important in providing high-quality, cost-effective health
care, but required rigorous privacy safeguards.
A. Automated Health Information
The health care system will store and transmit more and
more information in electronic form. Automation will support
efforts to provide higher quality, cost-effective health care.
Data collected will provide information needed for quality as-
surance, analysis of practice patterns and patient outcomes,
and scientific research, all of which contribute to higher quality
care. These data also can better inform consumers of their
health care choices. Health care costs can be reduced by elimi-
nating the need for duplicate tests, making it easier to detect
fraud based upon more detailed examination of practice, and
eliminating enormous paperwork burdens from patients, health
care professionals, and health plans. Automation also supports
the goal of portability of health coverage. Information will be
readily available in a mobile society, as consumers move from
provider to provider, plan to plan.
The ease of collection, storage, and transmission of data
over electronic networks also creates significant risks to pri-
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vacy. Health records contain a vast amount of personal infor-
mation: demographic information such as age, sex, race, and
occupation; financial information such as employment status,
income, disabilities, and participation in federal or state pro-
grams; medical information such as diagnosis, treatments, and
disease histories including mental illness, drug or alcohol de-
pendency, AIDS, or sexually transmitted diseases (STDs); and
social information such as family, sexual relationships, and
lifestyle choices. This information is frequently sufficient to
provide a detailed profile of the individual. Traditional medical
records, moreover, are only a subset of automated records con-
taining substantial health or personal information held by edu-
cators, employers, law enforcement, and government agencies.
The importance of privacy and security of automated
records is widely acknowledged with numerous governmental
and nongovernmental committees working on the issue, includ-
ing the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment,5 the
Institute of Medicine,6 the Physician Payment Review Com-
mission,7 and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (HHS)." A General Accounting Office (GAO) report rec-
ommends that the federal government set out national
standards for the protection of automated health records.9
B. Health Cards and Unique Identifiers
Under many proposals for health care reform at the fed-
eral or state level, health cards would be issued to eligible per-
sons entitling them to register in a health plan and to receive
5. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT. U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-TCT-576, PRO-
TECTING PRIVACY IN COMPUTERIZED MEDICAL INFORMATION (1993).
6. See MOLLA S. DONALDSON & KATHLEEN N. LOHR, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
HEALTH DATA IN THE INFORMATION AGE: USE. DISCLOSURE, AND PRIVACY (1994).
7. See PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 315-
16 (1994) (citing OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 5).
8. See WORK GROUP ON COMPUTERIZATION OF PATIENT RECORDS. U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., REPORT OF THE WORK GROUP ON COMPUTERIZATION OF
PATIENT RECORDS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SER-
VICES (1993) (analyzing the risks and benefits to personal privacy inherent in computeriza-
tion of health care information).
9. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT & TECHNOLOGY DIVISION. GEN. ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE. PUB. No. GAO/IMTEC-93-17, AUTOMATED MEDICAL RECORDS: LEADERSHIP
NEEDED TO EXPEDITE STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT: REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN COMMITTEE
ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE 16-17 (1993) (recommending that Congress
provide leadership to the private sector or elevate the role of federal agencies in developing
standards).
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services. Basic both to health care reform and to current efforts
at developing electronic health care networks is the use of a
unique identifier for each person. A unique identifier is neces-
sary to help ensure the accuracy of information and efficient
operation of the health care system. Perhaps the most critical
single decision regarding privacy and security is whether to use
the social security number (SSN) as the individual identifier.
Most of the recent health care initiatives have proposed using
the SSN as the unique personal identifier because it provides
the most cost-effective way of identifying the individual and re-
liably collecting and sharing personal information.10
Many people in the privacy community object to the use of
the SSN because of its extensive use for a large variety of non-
health related purposes and its potential ability to link
databases. Among the users of the SSN are debt collectors, de-
partment stores, utilities, check validation services, supermar-
kets, cable television, credit card issuers, banks, major oil com-
panies, the Internal Revenue Service, other federal agencies
(the military, the Parent Locator Service, food stamps, the Se-
lective Service System), mailing list companies, credit bureaus,
law enforcement agencies, insurance companies, the Medical
Information Bureau, motor vehicles departments, employers,
schools and universities, and state agencies.1'
Many fear that the Social Security number has become a
de facto national identifier. 2 Evan Hendricks noted:
Not only does the SSN make it easier for large institutions to
compare their databases, it allows curious individuals (in-
cluding private detectives, computer hackers or other stran-
gers you might not want snooping in your private life) to
"hop" from database to database and draw out a profile of
your buying habits and personal lifestyle.' 3
Whatever the unique identifier that is chosen, the fears ex-
pressed by many citizens must be mitigated by establishing a
10. See H.R. 5464, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2215 (1992) (The Medical and Health
Insurance Reform Information Act of 1992); H.R. 200, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 321(c)(2)(C) (1993) (Health Care Cost Containment and Reform Act of 1993).
11. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvs. THE
EXTENT OF USE OF SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS 1-5 (1988) (listing the expanded uses of
social security numbers under federal law and administrative decisions).
12. Id.
13. Use of Social Security Number as a National Identifier: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Social Security of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
101, 106 (1991) (testimony of Evan Hendricks, editor of Privacy Times).
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national privacy policy that explicitly forbids the linking of
health care and other information using the SSN. Exceptions
for limited, clearly defined purposes such as the development of
statistical information in nonidentifiable form may be
permitted. 4
Systematic collection of this highly sensitive personal in-
formation can work only in conjunction with a national level
privacy policy based on fair information practices. The national
policy would replace the current patch work of state laws and
would provide the framework for sharing information gener-
ated at all levels of the health care system - only a national
policy can cover information in interstate commerce.
C. Patient-based Longitudinal Health Records
The growing need for detailed micro-level health data gen-
erated by reform efforts is emerging in an environment in
which the future vision of health information systems is already
undergoing radical change. Although many health records have
long existed in automated form, they have traditionally sup-
ported specific functions such as the laboratory, pharmacy, or
finance department. A fundamental shift to patient-based
records is now occurring as part of longer-term efforts toward
building national electronic patient-based health information
networks.1 5
14. For example, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
239, § 6103(a), 103 Stat. 2106, 2189 (1989) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 229(a)
(Supp. V 1993)), created the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR). It
also established a program of research on health care outcomes and procedures, id.
§ 6103(b)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 132b6-12(a)(1)(Supp. V 1993)), and mandated
that:
the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall report to the Congress on the
feasibility of linking research-related data described in section [42 U.S.C.
§ 132b6-12(d)] with similar data collected or maintained by non-Federal entities
and by Federal agencies other than the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (including the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs and the Office
of Personnel Management).
Id. § 6103(b)(2), 103 Stat. 2106, 2198 (reported at 42 U.S.C. § 132b6-12, Directives).
15. COMMITTEE ON IMPROVING THE PATIENT RECORD. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES. THE COMPUTER-BASED RECORD 31-35 (Richard S. Dick,
Elaine B. Steen eds., 1991) While particular groups vary in the specifies of their vision,
those focusing on development of automated health care systems, such as the Computer-
based Patient Record Institute, Medical Record Institute, and the American National
Standards Institute, see a system of several parts emerging in the long run:
-a comprehensive longitudinal computer-based patient record containing all clinical, fi-
nancial, and research data.
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The development of electronic health care networks per-
mitting standardized patient-based information to flow nation-
wide, and perhaps even worldwide, means that the current pri-
vacy protection focus requiring the institution to protect its
records must be reconsidered. Our past thinking assumed a pa-
per or automated record that was created and protected by the
provider. We may now envision a patient-based record that an-
yone in the system can call up on the screen.18 Because loca-
tion has less meaning in an electronic world, many now argue
that protecting privacy requires attaching privacy protections
to the health record itself, rather than to the institution that
generates it.
II. CURRENT LEGISLATIVE PROTECTION OF
PRIVACY
Despite these fundamental changes in the health informa-
tion infrastructure, very little federal legislation of general ap-
plicability exists regulating the use and disclosure of personal
information by private entities. State law that does exist repre-
sents a patchwork of inconsistent and inadequate protection of
informational privacy. This section provides a brief history of
the protection of health information privacy and examines cur-
rent legal protections.
A. Contemporary Historical Perspectives on Privacy
Protection
Elliot Richardson, the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) in the early 1970s, mounted a major policy
effort on health information privacy. He established an Advi-
sory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, which
presented its report Records, Computers, and the Rights of
*a "national" electronic network for accessing this health record for a variety of purposes
such as primary care, insurance payment, peer review, cost containment, public health,
and research purposes.
-use of a smart card for purposes ranging from providing health insurance coverage in-
formation to providing a conception-to-death record of all health care.
-use of unique patient-specific identifiers in the U.S. and, perhaps, worldwide.
16. John P. Fanning addressed this issue in his U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services memorandum. Musings of John Fanning on Legal Controls for Informa-
tion held in Computerized Systems, Memorandum from John P. Fanning, Senior Health
Policy Advisor, Office of Asst. Secretary of Health, U.S. Public Health Service (Apr. 1,
1993) [hereinafter Fanning Memo] (on file with author).
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Citizens' in 1973. The Committee developed principles of
"fair information practices" including personal control of data,
no secret record systems, rights of access and correction, and
the responsibility of managers for security of data. 8
A significant outgrowth of that effort was the Privacy Act
of 1974,19 which Congress developed from the principles in the
HEW report. The Act covers data collection and maintenance
by Federal government agencies, but not by the private sector.
Its approach is to set up a comprehensive data management
scheme and procedures, rather than strong disclosure prohibi-
tions. It includes some control over the use of the social secur-
ity number by all government agencies, including those at the
state and local levels. In addition, the Privacy Act established
the Privacy Protection Study Commission that was time-lim-
ited and had no supervisory or regulatory powers. The Com-
mission reviewed the use and disclosure of personal data in a
wide variety of fields and produced a report Personal Privacy
in an Information Society.20 The report made recommenda-
tions in the areas of financial, medical, research, statistical, tax,
and government access to records."' At the same time, the
Nixon administration developed a mechanism for ongoing at-
tention to these issues in the form of the Domestic Council
Committee on the Right of Privacy.2 1
The 1977 Privacy Protection Study Commission recom-
mended the enactment of legislation that would regulate cer-
tain disclosures of medical records (e.g., direct treatment,
health and safety, biomedical or epidemiological research, au-
dit or evaluation, and judicial summons or subpoena). It pre-
17. SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS. U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH. EDUCATION AND WELFARE. RECORDS. COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF
CITIZENS (1973).
18. Id. at 41.
19. See Gostin, supra note 2, (manuscript at 53-5, on file with author) (describing
the Federal Privacy Act of 1974 as it relates to health information).
20. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N. PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION
SOCIETY (1977).
21. Id. at 306-07 (recommending guidelines that will preserve the expectation of
confidentiality in the medical care relationship).
22. Address of President Nixon (radio broadcast, February 23, 1974) (transcript in
PuB PAPERS OF RICHARD NIXON 174 (1974)) (establishing a White House committee to
examine the collection, storage, and use of personal data in computer retrieval systems,
chaired by then Vice President Ford). See also THE DOMESTIC COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY AND THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS. PRIVACY. A PUBLIC
CONCERN A RESOURCE DOCUMENT (1975).
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scribed a series of data protection measures that limited dis-
closure "to information necessary to accomplish the purpose for
which the disclosure is made," required individuals to be in-
formed of disclosures that may be made without their express
authorization, and mandated the use of carefully defined and
circumscribed forms for required authorizations. 3
The Privacy Commission delivered its report to the Carter
administration which established a privacy initiative and devel-
oped bills to implement the recommendations in the report;
however, these bills were generally unsuccessful in obtaining
passage. Limited financial privacy legislation was enacted, and
although medical record privacy legislation was considered at
length in both houses of Congress, it failed in a floor vote in the
House in December of 1980.24 The comprehensive bill to ad-
dress medical record privacy that was presented sought to es-
tablish minimum standards for medical care facilities, not indi-
vidual physicians. 25 The most debatable part of the Federal
Privacy of Medical Information Bill was Part C which author-
ized fourteen separate types of disclosures of medical informa-
tion without patient authorization. 26 However, most of the dis-
closures allowed were qualified by language requiring some
accounting, reporting, and documentation of the need for dis-
closures and restrictions on redisclosures. The institution (i.e.,
hospital or nursing home) also could impose additional require-
ments for disclosures made without the consent of the patient.
Other medical information acts, including the American Medi-
cal Association's (AMA) Model Confidentiality of Health Care
Information Act 27 and the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws' Uniform Health-Care Infor-
mation Act 28 also list many disclosures without patient
authorization.
23. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, supra note 20, at 313-15.
24. See 132 CONG. REC. H1625-01 (1986) (noting that despite Congressional agree-
ment that existing legislation inadequately protected medical records, the Privacy Commis-
sion's recommendations were not enacted).
25. See H.R. Rep. No. 832, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 7 (1980) (accompanying
H.R. 5935).
26. Id. at 8.
27. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N, DEP'T OF STATE LEGISLATION. MODEL CONFIDENTI-
ALITY OF HEALTH CARE INFORMATION ACT § 4(b) (1994) (on file with author).
28. UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE INFORMATION ACT 1985, at § 2-104 (1985).
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Although the Carter administration was generally support-
ive, the American Civil Liberties Union and other organiza-
tions were critical of the long list of disclosures of medical in-
formation allowed without patient consent. 9 In addition, the
AMA and the American Hospital Association (AHA) opposed
comprehensive federal legislation for medical privacy arguing
that states should handle the matter.3 0
In 1981, the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners (NAIC) proposed a model act, the Insurance Informa-
tion and Privacy Protection Model Act, which fifteen states
have adopted.31 The model bill requires provision of notice of
fair insurance information practices, 2 specifies the content of
disclosure authorization forms, 3 and regulates access to re-
corded personal information.3 4 The act authorizes separate dis-
closures without the written consent of the individual, including
for disclosures for marketing.3 5 While the insurance regulatory
official of a state is responsible for monitoring under the act,36
it is not known whether the model act is proving to be effective
in practice.
All the efforts until this time were based upon the assump-
tion that more and more data would be needed and used. Rules
were established to insure that collection of systematic health
data proceeded without causing undue harm to the individual.
The major efforts took a procedural approach and enunciated
principles to assure fairness in maintaining and disclosing data.
These efforts offered little philosophical basis for making
choices whether the collector of information should keep partic-
29. Federal Privacy of Medical Information Act: Hearing on H.R. 5935 Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the House of Representatives Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 37-38 (1980) (statement of the American Civil Liberties Union read by
Marcia K. Goin, Chairperson, Committee on Confidentiality, American Psychiatric
Association).
30. Id. at 56-58, 82-85 (prepared statements of the American Medical Association
and American Hospital Association).
31. 4 NATIONAL ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS. MODEL INSURANCE LAW, REGULATIONS
AND GUIDELINES. NAIC Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Model Act, at 670-
1, 670-23 to 670-25 (1994).
32. Id. § 4.
33. Id. § 6.
34. Id. § 8.
35. Id. § 13(K).
36. Id. § 14.
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ular records at all or whether an individual should consent to
disclosure.3 7
Proposals for computerizing medical records3 8 have stimu-
lated attention to privacy hazards. In June 1992, then Secre-
tary of HHS, Louis Sullivan, forwarded a draft bill to Congress
that would have mandated the automation of the Medicare
claims system and some hospital medical records, required the
use of "smart cards" and of the social security number as the
unique identifier for health care information, and strengthened
privacy protections.3 9
The President's Health Security Act and several other
health care reform bills introduced in Congress in 1994 had
detailed provisions for the development of a health information
infrastructure.40 In particular, the Fair Health Information
Practices Act of 1994, introduced by Representative Condit,
provided a comprehensive strategy for protection of health in-
formation through the formation of health information trust-
ees. 41 These trustees would fulfill a fiduciary duty to the patient
by adopting fair information practices throughout a modern
health care system.
C. Current Legal Protection of Health Information Privacy
In Congressional testimony on April 21, 1986, Robert R.
Belair summarized the state of health information privacy pro-
tection as "very poor" and "unprotective of patient interests."4
Another commentator concluded that federal and state law
"affords meager guidance for establishing a framework for the
protection of medical records. ' 43 A recent U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services report concluded that state rules
37. Fanning Memo, supra note 16.
38. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
39. See S. 2878, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 2211, 2215 (1992).
40. See, e.g., H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 5101 (1994) (Health Security Act);
S. 1770, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3308 (1993) (Health Equity and Access Reform Today
Act of 1993) (containing general principles that must be considered when developing pri-
vacy and confidentiality standards).
41. H.R. 4077, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
42. Information Technologies in the Health Care System: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Investigations and Oversight of the Comm. on Science and Technology, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 141 (1986) (statement of Robert R. Belair).
43. Bernard R. Adams, Medical Research and Personal Privacy, 30 VILLANOVA L
REv. 1077, 1089 (1985).
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superimposed on a federal regulatory framework result in a
morass of erratic law, both statutory and judicial.44
Perhaps the most often cited problem with the current col-
lection and use of information is the lack of any national-level
policy establishing a legal right of medical privacy. More pro-
tection exists for credit records and video rental information
than exists for sensitive personally identifiable health care in-
formation. 45 What protection does exist is in the form of dispa-
rate and often conflicting state laws and narrow federal regula-
tions. State privacy laws do exist, but they are not uniform,
may not address automation of health information, or may
serve as an impediment to automation. In sum, there exists
only an inconsistent and usually unenforced web of law that
leaves many gaps in protection of privacy.
Although there is an inherent understanding of the need
for confidentiality of medical record information, it also should
be recognized that the integrity and accuracy of such informa-
tion is of equal importance. If information used in health care
applications is not accurate, at best, it may be useless for in-
tended purposes and, at the extreme, it actually may pose a
life-threatening danger. Also, no specific standards that address
the need for ready availability of health data exist.
Current privacy and confidentiality protections are a prod-
uct of federal and state constitutional law, federal and state
statutes, and state common law. The Supreme Court held in
Whalen v. Roe46 that when states establish reporting require-
ments, the public health department must have minimal stan-
dards for protecting the privacy of sensitive medical informa-
tion.47 The doctrine of Whalen v. Roe, however, applies only to
governmental agencies, not to private parties; it has been rarely
44. See WORKGROUP FOR ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE. REPORT, OCTOBER.
1993. App. 4, 3 (1993) (discussing the implementation of identification system to be used
for health care services).
45. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681s (1988 & Supp. V
1993) (regulating release of credit reports); Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2711 (1988)(regulating disclosure of videocassette rental records).
46. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1977) (describing the safeguards designed
to prevent unauthorized access to computerized records of prescription drugs).
47. Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Future of Public Health Law, 12 AM. J.L. & MED.
461, 485 (1986).
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and inconsistently applied outside the specific facts of that
case.
48
Since the 1970s, more than a dozen states have adopted
constitutional amendments designed to protect a variety of pri-
vacy interests, including limitations on access to personal infor-
mation.49 Although most of the state constitutional provisions
only protect against breaches of privacy by governmental agen-
cies, some courts also have applied their guarantees to private
parties.50
The main protection for informational privacy resides in
legislation and the common law. The landmark Federal Privacy
Act of 1974 protects citizens from government disclosure of
confidential information.5 1 Hospitals operated by the federal
government and private health care or research institutions
maintaining medical records under government contract are
subject to its provisions. The Act, however, does not apply to
other institutions. 2
Federal law 53 creates strict rules for maintaining the confi-
dentiality of records of patients treated for drug or alcohol de-
pendency at facilities receiving federal assistance.5 The protec-
tions apply only to specialized substance abuse treatment
facilities and to specialized units within general medical facili-
48. See, e.g., J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090-91 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that
constitutional privacy rights do not extend to disclosures of personal information contained
in juvenile delinquent social histories); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638
F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980) (adopting specific set of criteria for applying constitutional
principles of informational privacy). See also Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitu-
tional Protection of Informational Privacy, B.U. L. REV. 133, 146-150 (1991) (reviewing
circuit court interpretations of Whalen).
49. ROBERT E. SMITH & JAMES S. SULANOWSKI. COMPILATION OF STATE AND FED-
ERAL PRIVACY LAWS 32-37 (1992).
50. See Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 85 (1991) (construing
protection of privacy rights under state constitution more expansively than rights protected
by the U.S. Constitution); Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Serv., 500 So.2d 533, 536-
37 (Fla. 1987) (citing the state constitution in holding that the disclosure of blood donors
implicated constitutionally protected privacy interests).
51. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
52. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (West Supp. 1994) (defining "agency" for purposes of 5
U.S.C. § 552).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (Supp. V 1993); 42 C.F.R. § 2.1-2.67 (1993).
54. Federal assistance includes tax-exempt status. 42 C.F.R. § 2.12(b)(4) (1994).
See generally NATIONAL INST. ON DRUG ABUSE. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERvs.. LEGAL OPINIONS ON THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE PA-
TIENT RECORDS 1975-1978 (providing legal opinions by the OIG interpreting the federal
alcohol and drug abuse confidentiality statutes).
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ties, but not to substance abuse information in general medical
records. 55
Many states have privacy protection contained in medical
and other professional practice acts, hospital, and other institu-
tional licensure laws and, in some cases, comprehensive medical
information statutes. These statutory schemes also contain
many important gaps in coverage. Many state medical records
statutes, for example, contemplate or require maintenance of
manual patient records so the protection afforded to automated
records is uncertain. 6 In addition, in most states there is little
or no regulation of the informational practices of insurers. Only
fifteen states have adopted model privacy legislation drafted by
the NAIC.57
Other state laws offer a patchwork of privacy protection
that is often disease-specific. For example, most states protect
information regarding HIV infection or AIDS.58 However,
many of these states allow or even require disclosure in so
many situations that the privacy rule itself becomes virtually
meaningless. Many state sexually transmitted disease statutes
contain strong protections of confidentiality, but communicable
disease or tuberculosis statutes contain weak protections or
none at all.59
Most states recognize a common law duty of confidential-
ity applying to certain health care professionals. Thus, if a pa-
tient discloses personal information to a health care profes-
sional believing that it is private, the professional may be liable
55. See 42 C.F.R. § 2.11 (1994) (defining programs covered under the statute).
56. See Deborah K. Fulton, Legal Problems Arising in the Automation of Medical
Records, 8 Topics IN HEALTH REC. MGMT. 73, 74 (1987) (discussing the requirement that
medical records fulfill licensing and other regulatory mandates that computerized records
may not be able to meet).
57. NATIONAL ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, supra note 31, at 670-23 to 670-25.
58. 1 MONA ROWE & BETHANY BRIDGHAM, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS:
LAWS GOVERNING CONFIDENTIALITY OF HIV-RELATED INFORMATION: 1983 TO 1988, at I-
4 (1989); see also 2 MONA ROWE & BETHANY BRIDGHAM, INDIVIDUAL STATE SUMMARIES:
LAWS GOVERNING CONFIDENTIALITY OF HIV-RELATED INFORMATION 1983-1988 (1989)
(providing a state-by-state analysis of HIV-related confidentiality protections).
59. Gostin, supra note 47, at 485-86 (describing state confidentiality protection for
sexually transmitted diseases); Lawrence 0. Gostin, Controlling the Resurgent Tuberculo-
sis Epidemic: A 50-State Survey of TB Statutes and Proposals for Reform, 269 JAMA
255, 260 (1993) (describing the limitations of state statutes protecting tuberculosis
patients).
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for disclosure without the patient's consent.60 While common
law protections of confidentiality probably provide the most
consistent safeguards, significant gaps exist in legal duties. For
example, in many states, the legal duties of physicians to safe-
guard patient confidences do not extend to other health care
professionals, researchers, or health care institutions, even
though the risk of harm from disclosure may be as great or
greater.61
For several important reasons, continued reliance upon
current legal safeguards is incompatible with the policy objec-
tives of an integrated national health care system."' A state-by-
state approach to regulation of medical information does not
reflect the realities of modern health care finance and delivery.
The flow of medical information is rarely restricted to the state
in which it is generated. Such information is routinely trans-
mitted to other states, subject to differing legal requirements,
for a wide variety of purposes ranging from medical consulta-
tion and research collaboration to governmental monitoring for
quality.
Further, the physical location of health information is no
longer a relevant consideration for development of privacy poli-
cies. Databases containing huge quantities of health informa-
tion provide the potential for immediate access by a variety of
eligible users in remote locations. Thus, state laws that attempt
to regulate information physically contained in a particular
state are anachronistic vestiges of a pre-electronic era.
The prospects for resolving privacy problems through the
enactment of model or uniform laws in every state is exceed-
ingly small. The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws developed the Uniform Health-Care In-
60. See, e.g., Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 696 P.2d 527, 535-36
(Or. 1985) (en banc) (holding a physician liable for breach of confidential relationship).
61. See People v. Baker, 288 N.W.2d 430, 431 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (refusing to
extend physician-patient privilege to optometrist); Quarles v. Sullivan, 389 S.W. 2d 249,
251 (Tenn. 1964) (refusing to imply a contract of confidentiality between company doctor
and an employee examined by him); Wendy Parmet, Note, Public Health Protection and
the Privacy of Medical Records, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 265. 274 (1981) (noting that
physicians provide less than 5% of American health care).
62. WORK GROUP ON COMPUTERIZATION OF PATIENT RECORDS, supra note 8, at
app. D (1993) (discussing confidentiality, privacy, and security concerns with computer-
based patient records).
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formation Act in 1985, but only two states, Montana and
Washington, have enacted it.6 3
The absence of uniform privacy and confidentiality protec-
tion applicable throughout the country imposes hardships on
most everyone. Health care institutions, insurance companies,
and self-insured employers who transmit health information
through interstate commerce often do so without clear guid-
ance regarding which state's laws govern or which state's
courts have proper jurisdiction to resolve disputes that may
arise. Without the ability to know and to rely upon uniform
privacy regulations, patients may lack the basis for meaningful
consent to disclosure of information. Lack of uniformity of pri-
vacy protections may adversely affect the integrity of health
data and the quality of care itself by undermining efforts to
automate health records.
These detriments of state-by-state privacy protections
would only be magnified in a health care system where patients
would be entitled to coverage anywhere they live in the country
and where information for monitoring quality and cost-effec-
tiveness would be collected nationally. Consequently, many per-
suasive reasons exist to adopt a uniform federal privacy policy
that transcends state borders.
III. THE ETHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVACY
In health care settings, a balance must be struck between
the rights and interests of individual patients and the poten-
tially competing interests of other individuals, families, groups,
and society generally. The nature and degree of protection that
should be accorded to the individual's interests in privacy and
confidentiality are among the most significant questions to be
addressed in the process of health care reform. The task is to
secure an adequate measure of respect for the privacy and au-
tonomy of the individual consistent with societal needs for an
efficient system of health care finance and delivery, an ade-
quate and reliable informational basis for health care planning,
and an enhanced capability for promoting and protecting the
public's health.
63. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-501-50-16-553 (1993); WASH REV, CODE ANN.
§§ 70.02.005-70.02.904 (West 1991).
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The potential harm to individual interests from disclosure
of personal medical or health information, as well as a strong
presumption in our society for respecting autonomy (the right
of the individual to retain control over aspects of his or her own
person) provide powerful arguments for restricting the access
others may have to such information. However, the informa-
tional requirements for realizing legitimate societal goals of
health care reform may necessitate that more rather than less
personal information is generated, collected, and made availa-
ble to designated others for a variety of treatment, research,
and policy planning purposes.
A. Definitions of Privacy and Confidentiality
PRIVAcY: A preliminary step in the analysis of how an in-
dividual's interests in privacy ought to be balanced against
other social goals is definitional. Legal, philosophical, social sci-
ence, and medical literatures abound with many different, com-
peting theories of privacy; no definition is likely to command
universal assent.
An influential definition attributed to Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis holds that privacy consists in being let alone.64
Critics object that this definition is too broad, and that there
are innumerable ways of being interfered with, or not being let
alone, that have nothing to do with privacy.6 5 Consequentially,
theorists have sought to refine privacy definitions to isolate
what is unique about privacy and what constitutes its loss, and
to reflect better the multiple dimensions of privacy.
Among the most prominent of such attempts are those
which define privacy as a condition of limited or restricted ac-
cessibility to some aspect of the person.6 However, to remain
inaccessible to others in some respect is not necessarily to be
inaccessible in all respects. Anita Allen usefully distinguishes
64. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, in PHILOSOPHI-
CAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 75, 75 (Ferdinand D. Schoeman ed., 1984).
But see Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF
PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 346, 357 (Ferdinand D. Schoeman ed., 1984).
65. See, e.g., W. A. Parent, Privacy, Morality and the Law, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF
269, 272 (1983).
66. See generally ANITA L. ALLEN. UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A
FREE SOCIETY (1987) (surveying limited access or restricted access definitions).
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among three types of inaccessibility - dispositional, physical,
and informational:
[P]rivacy is a condition of inaccessibility of the person, his or
her mental states, or information about the person to the
senses or surveillance devices of others. To say that a person
possesses or enjoys privacy is to say that, in some respect and
to some extent, the person (or the person's mental state, or
information about the person) is beyond the range of others'
five senses and any devices that can enhance, reveal, trace, or
record human conduct, thought, belief or emotion.67
Other definitions similarly emphasize the many possible aspects
of a person for which increased access might be counted as a
particular kind of privacy loss. For example, Ruth Gavison's
definition includes limited access in the sense of solitude, se-
crecy, and anonymity.65
Such multi-dimensional, limited-access definitions mark
useful distinctions among the various types of privacy losses
that individuals may experience. Moreover, they illuminate the
extent to which a loss of privacy in one respect often can result
in a loss of privacy in another. For example, the involuntary
testing of a patient for a genetic condition or HIV infection
involves a loss of physical privacy in the process of drawing the
patient's blood, as well as a loss of informational privacy when
the results are analyzed in the laboratory and recorded in a
medical system.
The blood test example also reveals a fourth sense of pri-
vacy widely familiar in both moral and legal theory. Many will
count the involuntary testing itself as involving a loss of what
has come to be known as decisional privacy.69 Critics of deci-
sional privacy complain that this extension of the concept rests
upon a confusion. They argue that the fundamental interests at
stake are not privacy interests but liberty interests, and that
what is morally relevant is the loss of liberty or deprivation of
autonomy.70
Although the dimension of privacy most centrally at stake
in the health care system is informational privacy, other mor-
67. Id. at 15.
68. GAvIsoN, supra note 64, at 354.
69. Anita L. Allen, Taking Liberties: Privacy, Private Choice, and Social Contract
Theory, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 461, 461 (1987).
70. See Parent, supra note 65, at 273-74.
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ally significant issues having to do with the individual's ability
to retain autonomous decision-making authority over important
aspects of his or her life are never far from that central
concern.
CONFIDENTIALITY: A closely related issue in the general
discussions of informational privacy is that of confidentiality.
Confidentiality is a characteristic of a relationship, such as that
of a physician and his or her patient. Equally, confidentiality is
a property of certain kinds of information, such that by the
information's very nature it ought not to be revealed to others
without the person's permission.
In American law, under many circumstances, certain in-
formation disclosed by an individual to a physician in the con-
text of a physician-patient relationship is protected from fur-
ther disclosure to others without a bona fide need to know. The
relationship is a confidential one; the information is confidential
in nature; and the physician is under a legal duty of
confidentiality.
Even in such a relatively straightforward statement of the
law, however, there are many thorny issues regarding confiden-
tiality. First, surely not all information learned by a physician
is the proper subject of such a duty. Arguably, only informa-
tion that relates to the patient's health status or other highly
sensitive or personal matters that the patient would not have
disclosed if the patient had not sought medical treatment would
qualify as confidential.
Second, there are substantial ambiguities about what con-
stitutes a physician-patient relationship. Without a threshold
determination that such a relationship exists, it is unclear, as a
legal matter at least, that the physician is under any duty of
confidentiality. The relationship between company physicians
and the employees they examine is a familiar instance of this
kind of controversy in the law. 71
Third, although traditional medical ethical norms, dating
as far back as the Oath of Hippocrates, reflect a strong com-
mitment to preserving the secrets of the patient, traditional
71. See, e.g., Bratt v. I.B.M. Corp., 467 N.E.2d 126, 137, nn. 21-22 (Mass. 1984)
(noting the tension between the general rule that when an employer retains a physician to
examine employees, no physician-patient relationship exists between the employee and the
physician, and the implicit rules evident in numerous statutes that patients have a recog-
nized interest in the confidentiality of personal information disclosed to a physician).
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common law in the U.S. is more equivocal. Common law rules
often permit disclosure of confidential information in the course
of litigation or to protect third parties. Thus, particular infor-
mation disclosed in the context of certain professional relation-
ships is best understood now as presumptively confidential, or
such as to establish a pro tanto duty not to disclose without the
express or implied consent of the patient.
B. Ethical Justifications for Privacy and Confidentiality
Protection
THE MORAL IMPORTANCE OF PRIVACY: The literature on
privacy abounds with accounts of the moral justifications for
rules of privacy. The different kinds or forms of privacy - se-
clusion, limited access, and informational privacy - highlight
different justifications and moral values. Still, it is possible to
sketch the general moral considerations at stake in respecting
privacy.
One standard account holds that the primary justification
for respecting privacy resides in the principle of respect for au-
tonomy. To respect the privacy of others is to respect their au-
tonomous wishes not to be accessed in some respect - not to
be observed or have information about themselves made availa-
ble to others. Joel Feinberg has observed that historically the
language of autonomy has functioned as a political metaphor
for a domain or territory in which a state is sovereign. 72 Per-
sonal autonomy carries over the idea of a region of sovereignty
for the self and a right to protect it - an idea closely linked to
the ideas of privacy and the right to privacy. The link between
privacy and autonomy is thus straightforward - respecting
privacy is one way or form of respecting autonomy.
This straightforward link between privacy and autonomy
does not, however, exhaust the relationship between these two
concepts. Respecting privacy is an important means of foster-
ing and developing a sense of self, of personhood, and of per-
sonal autonomy. Indeed, without some level of privacy, it is dif-
72. Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Consti-
tution?, 58 NOTRE DAmE L. REV. 445, 452 (1983) ("The politically independent state is
said to be sovereign over its own territory. Personal autonomy similarly involves the idea of
having domain or territory in which the self is sovereign. But whereas international conven-
tions and treaties have long since defined the idea of 'national territory' with some preci-
sion, the 'boundaries' of the personal domain are entirely obscure and controversial.").
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ficult to imagine how individuals can formulate autonomous
preferences or, more basically, develop the capacity to be self-
governing. Certain conditions of privacy are necessary for the
development or at least the fostering of personhood and per-
sonal autonomy. Thus, privacy is of instrumental value where it
promotes personhood, autonomy, or self-governance.
Personhood and personal autonomy are not, however, the
only or even necessarily the most morally significant ends pro-
moted by privacy. Privacy enhances the development and main-
tenance of intimate human relationships - relations of trust,
friendship, and love. It is arguably one of the defining charac-
teristics of intimate relationships that they involve the sharing
- freely given - of private information, spaces, and acts. In
an intimate relationship, we allow another to enter the other-
wise private sphere of our lives. If privacy is not cherished and
respected, both the capacity for, and meaning of, intimacy in
human relationships are clearly diminished. Indeed, as Charles
Fried has argued, "privacy is ...necessarily related to ends
and relations of the most fundamental sort: respect, love,
friendship and trust. Privacy is not merely a good technique for
furthering these fundamental relations; rather, without privacy
they are simply inconceivable. 7 3
Additionally, information frequently is viewed as a re-
source, the possession of which by others enables them to exer-
cise power over individuals.74 This raises the possibility of ex-
ploitation and the consequential loss of psychological, -social,
and economic well-being.
We need not here resolve which is the more foundational
moral justification for respecting privacy - the formation of
intimate relationships, respect for autonomy, or the develop-
ment of personhood and capacity for autonomous expression.
The central point here is that privacy's moral value is in the
main derivative and based on a complex of moral commitments
and concerns.
RULES OF MEDICAL CONFIDENTIALITY: At least five kinds
of moral arguments may be used to justify rules of confidential-
ity in the medical context. First, rules of medical confidentiality
should be respected as instances of general obligations to re-
73. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE LJ. 475, 477 (1968).
74. Parent, supra note 65, at 276.
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spect informational privacy. Second, medical confidentiality
must be respected because of the special moral character of the
physician-patient relationship. That is, confidentiality is intrin-
sic to the very nature of this relationship, characterized as it is
(or should be) by trust and intimacy. Third, medical confidenti-
ality should be respected because there is at least an implicit
and sometimes explicit promise of confidentiality embedded in
the institution of medical care, and it is wrong to break a
promise. Fourth, rules of medical confidentiality should be
respected because these rules are necessary to bring about good
to patients and to society; without this assurance of confidenti-
ality, people would not share medically relevant information.
Finally, rules of medical confidentiality should be respected be-
cause they are necessary to prevent patients from the harm
that could reasonably befall them if information collected in
the course of treatment became publicly available.
D. Potential Harms Created By Loss of Informational
Privacy
The ethical justifications for privacy protections and rules
of confidentiality point to a variety of underlying harms that
may result from unwanted disclosures of personal medical or
health status information. These harms can be classified as in-
trinsic and consequential moral harms.
Intrinsic moral harms are those that result from the mere
fact of an unwanted or unjustified disclosure of personal infor-
mation. Many moral views at least recognize the desirability of
protecting individuals against insult to dignity and the lack of
respect for the person evidenced by such disclosures.
Consequential harms are those that result from a loss of
privacy, and they matter morally regardless of whether the loss
of privacy is a consequence of an intentional, negligent, or per-
fectly innocent action of another. The morally significant fea-
ture of such losses of privacy lie in the actual harm that is
caused.
Consequential harms can affect a person's economic inter-
ests. These include the potential loss of employment or em-
ployability or loss of insurance or insurability. Often the loss of
insurance and employment (or insurability and employability)
go hand-in-hand when, for example, the only affordable insur-
ance is through employment, or the most effective way employ-
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ers have to contain the costs of production is to hold down em-
ployee benefit costs by excluding from the workforce those
costly to insure. Another economic interest at risk of harm
from invasion of privacy is loss of housing opportunities, espe-
cially for those having stigmatizing conditions such as HIV in-
fection, tuberculosis, mental illness, or a history of drug or al-
cohol abuse.
A second category of harm involves social or psychological
dimensions. Disclosure of some conditions can be stigmatizing
and can cause embarrassment, social isolation, and the loss of
self-esteem. These risks are especially great when the perceived
causes of the medical condition or illness include the use of ille-
gal drugs, socially disfavored forms of sexual expression, or
other behavior not widely socially approved.
Moreover, stigmatization may be a consequence of such
disclosures in some instances even when the potential causes do
not involve any despised choices or behavior on the part of the
affected individual. Family members, neighbors, and work asso-
ciates may withdraw social support from those learned to have
certain conditions or diseases, especially if such conditions in-
volve mental or emotional instability or physical or behavioral
attributes that some individuals find uncomfortable to observe.
Indeed, such stigmatization may occur even toward those who
do not currently manifest symptoms of a disease.
E. When Privacy Is Not the Paramount Consideration
Although privacy is important, it is not always unambigu-
ously a positive value. Some states or conditions of privacy are
undesirable or morally wrong, as when seclusion brings loneli-
ness or isolation, and secrecy conceals wrongdoing or harms
others. Even when privacy is unambiguously a good, it is not
always paramount in conflicts with other cherished values. Pri-
vacy interests can be outweighed by competing moral consider-
ations of greater value in the circumstance. For example, there
may be a need to access an individual's personal health infor-
mation in order to prevent harm to an identifiable other party,
or to benefit the person who is the subject of the information,
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or to benefit another person.' 5 Alternatively, access to the in-
formation may be needed in order to further the legitimate and
valued social interests of all citizens in such matters as public
accountability, monitoring, and evaluation of the health care
system, efficiency in the delivery of care, scientific advance and
medical knowledge, and the public's health.
IV. FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES
Concern for protecting personal privacy is a leading issue
in all Western industrial societies. Legislators have responded
to these concerns by enacting protective laws. Principles of fair
information practices, although stated somewhat differently
from country-to-country, serves as the basis for these laws. In
the U.S., traditional fair information practice principles are the
foundation for the Privacy Act of 1974 which applies to federal
records. These practices stipulate that individuals about whom
data are collected have the right to know about and approve
the uses to which data are put, that no secret data systems are
permitted to exist, and that individuals have the right to review
and to correct data about themselves.
Following these principles requires that: (i) information
should be collected only to the extent necessary to carry out the
purpose for which the information is collected; (ii) information
collected for one purpose should not be used for another pur-
pose without the individual's informed consent; (iii) informa-
tion should be disposed of when no longer necessary to carry
out the purpose for which it was collected; (iv) methods to en-
sure accuracy, reliability, relevance, completeness, and timeli-
ness of information should be instituted; (v) individuals should
be notified (in advance of the collection of information)
whether the furnishing of information is mandatory or volun-
tary, what recordkeeping practices exist, and what the uses will
be made of the information; and (vi) individuals should be per-
mitted to inspect and correct information concerning
themselves.
75. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334, 343 (Cal.
1976) (imposing upon psychiatrist an affirmative duty to warn third parties to prevent fore-
seeable, unreasonable risk of harm).
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A. Informed Consent
If a goal of privacy protection is to ensure the right of
individuals to exercise control over information about them-
selves, then procedures for ensuring informed consent have to
be expanded, enhanced, and regularized."8 Individuals have a
right to learn what will happen with their personal information,
even if many of the disclosures are mandatory. The key ele-
ments of informed consent are thorough disclosure, comprehen-
sion of the information, voluntariness in acting, competence to
act, and consent to the action."
Creative and responsive informed consent procedures can
readily be built into software used in hospitals or physicians'
offices. The software could automatically remind health care
providers of the need to renew an informed consent statement
for a particular patient after the lapse of an agreed-upon time.
Patients should be reminded, perhaps once a year, of how their
personal data are being used for any purpose beyond direct
care and billing.
B. Use of Data for Intended Purposes
One of the core fair information practices is that personal
data should be used only for the purpose for which they were
collected. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development's influential 1981 Guidelines on the Protection of
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data specify that
the purpose for which personal data are collected should be
specified not later than at the time of data collection. The sub-
sequent use should be limited to the fulfillment of those pur-
poses or compatible purposes. Subsequent uses should be speci-
fied on each occasion of change of purpose. Such data cannot
be otherwise used without the consent of the data subject or
without legal authority78
76. See generally FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE (2d ed., 1990) (discussing procedural protections for informed consent).
77. Tom L. Beauchamp, Informed Consent, in MEDICAL ETHICS 173, 180 (Robert
M. Veatch ed., 1989).
78. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEV,. GUIDELINES ON THE
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA 10 (1981).
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C. Access to Records
The principle of granting all individuals full access to their
medical and health records has not received appropriate legal
or practical attention. Many persons do not enjoy such access
and the empowerment that would come from knowing what is
being written about them. Some states do not provide a statu-
tory right of access to a patient's own medical record.79 It is
possible even to imagine, over time, a trend toward the use of
"plain English" in medical record keeping, such as has oc-
curred in U.S. credit reporting.
D. Self-regulation and Training of Staff
All organizations and offices that collect health informa-
tion, including hospitals and health insurance companies, must
produce their own information codes within the framework of
fair information practices that govern their behavior. Prepara-
tion of a privacy protection policy is an excellent method of
requiring specialized groups to consult their own self-interest,
to report on their own good practices, and to formulate reason-
able solutions to outstanding problems. Such efforts at self-reg-
ulation can result in pamphlets and public notices used to in-
form the general public better about the privacy code in place
and to assuage consumer concerns in specific settings. Ideally,
for example, a hospital's Privacy Protection Committee should
treat such matters on an ongoing basis.
Staff in institutions and organizations must be trained and
retrained; detailed manuals of appropriate procedures must be
developed; and monitoring and auditing of compliance with
stipulated norms must be in place.
V. SECURITY OF HEALTH INFORMATION
SYSTEMS
The National Research Council (NRC) states "[tihe na-
tion needs computer technology that supports substantially in-
79. But see Terri F. Arnold, Note, Let Technology Counteract Technology: Protect-
ing the Medical Record in the Computer Age, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 455, 471
(1993) (noting that many states have affirmed patient access rights).
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creased safety, reliability, and, in particular, security."' 0 The
NRC further defines security as:
protection against unwanted disclosure, modification, or de-
struction of data in a system and also the safeguarding of
systems themselves. Security, safety, and reliability together
are elements of system trustworthiness - which inspires the
confidence that a system will do what it is expected to do.81
As automated health care records systems increasingly contain
standardized health care information capable of being trans-
mitted nationwide, and perhaps worldwide, over electronic net-
works, "society becomes more vulnerable to poor systems de-
sign, accidents that disable systems, and attacks on computer
systems. ' 2 Opportunities for using electronic health care net-
works also may be lost if there is serious mistrust of their
safety.
Establishing appropriate security standards can, within the
proper legislative framework, both strengthen patient privacy
and confidentiality and assure that information is available to
improve the quality and efficiency of health care services. With
existing paper systems, information requests often result in the
release of data that are not pertinent to the current request as
total documents are photocopied and/or faxed to users. With
computerized systems, tailored selection of data items from an
individual health record easily makes it possible to share only
the information that is necessary to the inquiry at hand. With
the establishment of appropriate access requirements, more ac-
curate, reliable, and cost-efficient protection of health care in-
formation can be achieved than with non-automated systems.
Automation makes it possible to maintain detailed records
of access to information or audit trails that were simply not
possible or practical in non-automated systems. Computers
watch computers, sometimes on a keystroke-by-keystroke basis,
and produce logs that supervisors and security officers can con-
sult when individuals complain or a record of activity on a file
or from a specific terminal or operator raises suspicions of un-
authorized behavior. Thus, security and data protection officers
80. SYSTEM SECURITY STUDY COMM.. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL. COMPUTERS AT
RISK: SAFE COMPUTING IN THE INFORMATION AGE 2 (1991) (emphasis in original).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1.
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might identify and question patterns of staff browsing in pa-
tients' records. 83
At the same time, computers make the anonymous explor-
ing of data an antiseptic process. Computerization makes files
that were difficult to use easier to access and thus increases the
range of secondary uses made of the data. A single breach of
security can result in a very large amount of information about
a lot of persons being disclosed. Computerization also makes it
easier to link information from many sources together increas-
ing the potential for undue intrusiveness into people's records
and lives. Individuals find it difficult to understand where infor-
mation about them resides and how that information has been
linked or used. Computerization can make it extremely difficult
to control effectively the redisclosure of information. Records
can be easily transmitted across state lines, making it difficult
for any state to offer reasonable protections.
Although making a computer system completely secure is
not feasible, much can be done to protect records. With careful
planning and use of technology, it should be possible not only
to address current privacy and security concerns for health care
information, but in some ways actually to improve the degree
of protection. At the same time, technological advances in elec-
tronic systems are proceeding at an accelerated pace, and more
sophisticated systems will soon replace today's state-of-the-art
systems.
Data protection policies, if they are to be effective in this
rapidly changing environment, must not be tied to specific sys-
tems and system capabilities, but rather must establish privacy
protection guidelines that define system goals but do not spec-
ify how these goals will be reached. These protections will be
most effective if privacy is addressed directly at the outset in
developing electronic systems. They should guarantee that only
those with authorized access can access records for authorized
purposes at authorized times. Because computer technology is
rapidly evolving, ongoing research ensures that these advances
83. See Jo ANNE C, BRUCE. PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN-
FORMATION 29-71 (1988) (discussing safeguards to confidentiality through the use of coun-
termeasures and internal audits including confidentiality training, identification badges,
requisition systems, and document destruction programs); Arnold, supra note 79, at 490
(recommending that courts consider whether information is adequately protected by system
tracking and detection).
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do not erode security practices. There also will be a need for
oversight and management structures promoting the develop-
ment and proper use of system security principles in the devel-
opment and implementation of health care data systems.
Effective security protection for health care information
will require use of technology that most computer systems and
networks do not regularly use today. While this technology ex-
ists and has been proven effective and affordable, it is not
widely used because it would have to be retrofitted to existing
systems or because of perceived costs or inconvenience. A con-
tinuing concern has been the acceptability of computer security
to health professionals if they perceive that security slows down
the flow of information needed for providing health care. These
concerns are valid, particularly in emergency situations where
seconds count or where the patient is unable to supply the nec-
essary information.
The steps identified by the NRC as necessary for achiev-
ing greater computer security and trustworthiness are as appli-
cable to health computer systems as to those serving other pur-
poses. These steps include promulgating a comprehensive set of
"Generally Accepted System Security Principles" that would
provide a clear statement of essential security features, assur-
ances, and practices.8 4 Among the major elements of these
principles are quality control, access control on code as well as
data, user identification and authentication, protection of exe-
cutable code, security logging, a security administrator, data
encryption, operational support tools to assist in verifying the
security state of the system, independent audits of the system,
and hazard analysis. Levels of access also can be established
recognizing the varying degrees of security required for differ-
ing kinds of information.
Threats to confidentiality can emerge from outside an or-
ganization as well as among an institution's own personnel, and
the security system should be designed to address each type of
threat. Regular security checks should be conducted and re-
corded. In addition to impeding unauthorized access to health
information, it is also important to establish that security poli-
cies for individuals and organizations who gain legitimate ac-
cess to patient records through networking, computer sharing,
84. SYSTEM SECURITY STUDY COMM., supra note 80, at 27.
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and/or outside computer services contracts. Most breaches of
security that now occur are the result of "insider" action. Or-
ganizations can use routine institutional review and monitoring
to evaluate appropriateness of access and security measures.
Employers should institute training programs so that employees
are fully aware of their responsibilities and the actions required
of them in performing their jobs.
Currently, the majority of standards in the U.S. are devel-
oped through a voluntary consensus process with participation
from both the public and private sectors. Within the federal
government, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989
assigned the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research
(AHCPR) responsibility for developing automated medical rec-
ord standards.8 5
VI. NEEDED ACTIONS
The provision of adequate privacy and security protection
measures for health information should be an integral part of
the development of a modern health care system. The following
recommended actions are based on analysis done in the course
of the work of the Health Information and Privacy Committee
of the President's Task Force on Health Care Reform.
Recommendation A
Establish, through preemptive federal legislation, a national
'privacy framework covering all health records that is based
upon the Code of Fair Information Practices and incorpo-
rates guidelines for informed consent.
No federal level legislation establishing the right of pri-
vacy for private sector medical or health care information ex-
ists. Current state and local laws are inconsistent and poten-
tially conflicting. A more uniform national standard for privacy
and confidentiality would simplify compliance for organizations
that operate nationwide and protect information that is increas-
ingly crossing state borders. It also would provide protection for
data that are linked or potentially linked to other data systems.
More uniform standards would make it easier for patients to
85. See supra note 14.
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have a clear understanding of how information about them is
protected.
The legal framework should establish comprehensive, na-
tional level privacy and confidentiality rights for individually
identifiable health care information. This national policy would:
(1) be applied to all information whether it is part of a mod-
ern health care system or exists outside of it and to all types
of health care information, regardless of form (electronic or
paper), location (storage, transit, archive), or user/holder
(government, provider, private organization);
(2) protect all individually identifiable health care informa-
tion equally, since different individuals will have different
perceptions of what should be considered sensitive; and
(3) establish enforceable and meaningful mechanisms and
penalties to ensure compliance and define implementation re-
sponsibilities for policy setting, administration, monitoring,
enforcement, and standards setting.
Privacy and confidentiality protections should be estab-
lished for all records whether they exist within a modern health
care system or outside it. Both medical records that document
the relationship between the physician and patient as well as
health records collected about and maintained on individuals
outside traditional health care settings must be protected.
Records containing substantial health information are devel-
oped and maintained by such diverse groups as educators, em-
ployers, and law enforcement agencies in the form of adminis-
trative and financial files. In order to protect the privacy and
confidentiality of the individual, it also is necessary to protect
health information in whatever form (paper or electronic) it is
maintained.
Traditionally, privacy protection includes restrictions on
the disclosure of information without the individual's consent.
However, some consent forms are not comprehensible or the
individual may be under stress when he or she is asked to com-
plete the consent form, or he or she may give consent under
pressure in order to receive some needed service. Therefore, to
protect individually identifiable information, the disclosure of
information to certain individuals and organizations should
take place only with the explicit, voluntary consent of the indi-
vidual after receiving reliable and clear information about the
disclosure. Consent forms for the release of information should
be limited in time, describe the type of information to be re-
[Vol. 5:1
1995] PRIVACY & SECURITY OF HEALTH INFORMATION 33
leased, and provide the purposes for which it is to be released.
Consumers should be given an opportunity to define material
that they consider to be especially sensitive and for which ex-
plicit specific, additional consent for release of information is
required.
Information that has no personal identifiers and that can-
not be linked to identifiable persons should be available to legit-
imate researchers without the explicit consent of the individual,
subject to approval by an institutional review board or the anal-
ogous policy-making board in a modern health care system.
These review boards should have explicit guidelines to recog-
nize and prevent demographic information from unintentionally
identifying individuals.
Recommendation B
Establish a system of universal identifiers for the health care
system.
Unique identifiers are needed to help ensure accuracy of
information and efficient operation of the health care system.
Such identifiers, however, should not become a risk to the pri-
vacy of the individual. Although the Social Security Number
(SSN) is the most obvious candidate for a health care identi-
fier, there are serious concerns about the privacy implications
in its use. The SSN could make it possible to link health and
other information about the individual both within and outside
the health care system, and there are some technical problems
with the numbers, including validation of accuracy, that would
need to be overcome at significant cost prior to its use in a
modern health care system.
Recommendation C
Establish a Data Protection and Security Panel(s) for over-
seeing and managing privacy policy and confidentiality mat-
ters and violations and security. While the National Data
Protection and Security Panel(s) should play the major pol-
icy setting role, states and other regulatory authorities, and
health plans also must be active partners in this process.
Establishing a Data Protection and Security Panel(s) will
fill a major gap in the privacy and security framework in the
U.S. Since 1974, many have proposed the creation of a privacy
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protection entity. 6 This panel's responsibilities with respect to
the privacy and confidentiality of health care information
should include:
(1) monitoring and evaluating the implementation of any
statutes and regulations enacted through health care reform,
and the authority to formally participate in any administra-
tive proceedings or processes having a material effect on the
protection of personal privacy, either as a result of govern-
mental or private sector actions or as a result of governmen-
tal regulation;
(2) conducting research and studies, investigating areas of
privacy concern, and supplementing other mechanisms in the
health care system through which citizens question the pro-
priety of information collected and used;
(3) issuing guidelines that must be followed by participants
in the health care system in implementing the requirements
of privacy statutes (these guidelines may deal with proce-
dural matters and with determinations of what information
must be available to individuals or the public;
(4) advising the President and the Congress, government
agencies, states, and other members of the health care re-
form system regarding the privacy implications of statutes or
regulations;
(5) supporting the development of consent forms governing
the disclosure and redisclosure of information; and
(6) promoting awareness among consumers about their pri-
vacy rights as well as the importance of using their health
care records for societal purposes such as fostering the ad-
vancement of medical research.
This panel's responsibilities with respect to security of
health care information systems should include:
(1) requiring that security standards be implemented in all
health care information systems and establishing penalties
for failure to do so;
(2) creating incentives for timely completion of security
standards development;
(3) funding pilot projects that demonstrate the technology
required for implementing security standards and sharing in-
formation in the health care setting;
86. See supra notes 19-41 and accompanying text.
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(4) working with standards development organizations and
involved Federal agencies to determine security require-
ments, and, on the basis of these requirements, setting secur-
ity standards development priorities; and
(5) working with the health provider community to foster
development of security standards responsive to their goals of
providing effective medical care.
Recommendation D
Establish a comprehensive program fostering privacy and se-
curity education and awareness among all members of the
health care system including the consumers of these health
care services about whom information is being collected.
Unless those involved in the health care system are aware
of their rights and responsibilities, established protections will
have limited impact. The Data Protection and Security
Panel(s) should play a leadership role in fostering the develop-
ment and implementation of orientation and training programs
for personnel with access to health care information as well as
supporting the development of programs for fostering consumer
awareness about their rights concerning the development and
redisclosure of information about them.
Threats to privacy often arise within organizations. Viola-
tions of privacy and confidentially may result from casual or
inadvertent disclosure or deliberate disclosure for financial or
personal gain. Training programs can be important mecha-
nisms for informing employees of their responsibilities and of
the penalties for misconduct. They can help to inculcate respect
for individual rights. Operating manuals, monitoring of staff
performance, and routine review of audit trails also will con-
tribute to controls on unauthorized release of health care
information.
Before establishing any health care information system,
there should be public notice of the contents, uses, and privacy
impacts of the system, as well as the right for interested groups
and individuals to comment on the proposed system to relevant
authorities. Handbooks describing patient rights concerning
records maintained about them should be distributed by regula-
tory authorities and health plans. To protect individual rights,
individuals have the right to expect, and the system has the
obligation to provide, assurances that personal records are as
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accurate, timely, and complete as the uses to which they are
being put require. They also have the right to know how these
records are routinely used and to agree to those uses.
CONCLUSION
Individuals have the right to expect, and the health care
system has the obligation to provide, assurances that personal
records are accurate, timely and complete, and that records
will be confidential and maintained in a secure system. The
success of the health care system depends in large part on the
integrity of information and the confidence of the public that
private information will be vigorously protected.
